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ABSTRACT
Artificial intelligence (AI) applications have been introduced
in humanitarian operations in order to help with the significant
challenges the sector is facing. This article focuses on
chatbots which have been proposed as an efficient method to
improve communication with, and accountability to affected
communities. Chatbots, together with other humanitarian AI
applications such as biometrics, satellite imaging, predictive
modelling and data visualisations, are often understood as part
of the wider phenomenon of ‘AI for social good’. The article
develops a decolonial critique of humanitarianism and critical
algorithm studies which focuses on the power asymmetries
underpinning both humanitarianism and AI. The article asks
whether chatbots, as exemplars of ‘AI for good’, reproduce
inequalities in the global context. Drawing on a mixed
methods study that includes interviews with seven groups of
stakeholders, the analysis observes that humanitarian chatbots
do not fulfil claims such as ‘intelligence’. Yet AI applications
still have powerful consequences. Apart from the risks
associated with misinformation and data safeguarding, chatbots
reduce communication to its barest instrumental forms which
creates disconnects between affected communities and aid
agencies. This disconnect is compounded by the extraction of
value from data and experimentation with untested
technologies. By reflecting the values of their designers and by
asserting Eurocentric values in their programmed interactions,
chatbots reproduce the coloniality of power. The article
concludes that ‘AI for good’ is an ‘enchantment of technology’
that reworks the colonial legacies of humanitarianism whilst
also occluding the power dynamics at play.
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In March 2016, the Silicon Valley start-up X2AI launched ‘Karim’, a psychotherapy chat-
bot, to support Syrian refugees in Lebanon. The chatbot uses natural language proces-
sing, a form of artificial intelligence (AI), to simulate human conversations in Arabic
through existing communication channels such as SMS texts or Facebook Messenger.
Given the prevalence of mental health issues in situations of displacement and war
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(Charlson et al., 2019) and given the parallel lack of trained psychotherapists in such set-
tings, chatbots have been proposed as a potential solution to meet the demand for help.
This particular chatbot was reportedly piloted on 60 Syrians ‘mostly men and boys’1 – a
small pilot for scaling up to a large and vulnerable population: there are over one million
Syrian refugees in Lebanon. X2AI developed the pilot in partnership with ‘Field Inno-
vationTeam’, a non-profit specialising in technology in disaster recovery, and the so-called
‘Singularity University’, the Silicon Valley business incubator and consultancy service.
Chatbots are increasingly prevalent in humanitarian settings and have been developed
both by humanitarian agencies as well as private companies, such as X2AI, as part of
‘Artificial Intelligence for social good’ (‘AI for good’ or ‘AI4SG’) initiatives. AI4SG,
which appears to be the prevailing term, refers to the applications powered by compu-
tation (such as machine leaning) which claim to be addressing social challenges.
AI4SG is part of the tradition of ‘technology for good’ and Information Communication
Technologies for Development (ICT4D) which include applications in humanitarian or
international development settings that typically aim to address the United Nation’s Sus-
tainable Development Goals.2 There are various AI applications in humanitarian settings,
such as satellite imagery, data visualisations, chatbots and biometrics.3 The United
Nations hosts an annual ‘AI for Good Summit’, while most humanitarian agencies
include ‘AI for good’ projects, often in partnerships with the private sector.4
The article analyses chatbots as emblematic of humanitarian AI applications in order
to question some of the assumptions behind the phenomenon of ‘AI for good’. Acknowl-
edging that both humanitarianism and technology are steeped in relations of power the
article asks whether chatbots, as exemplars of ‘AI for good’, reproduce inequalities in the
global context. Drawing on a wider study of digital innovation, data and automation in
humanitarianism which includes interviews, participant observation and digital ethno-
graphy, I observe that chatbots do not fulfil the promises of ‘intelligence’. This does
not imply that chatbots have no significant consequences. On the contrary, the article
argues that chatbots can present significant risks regarding data safeguards and misinfor-
mation which can have adverse consequences for some of the world’s most vulnerable
people. By reducing participation to a ‘box-ticking exercise’, by extracting value from
data and experimentation with new technologies and by asserting Eurocentric values
in humanitarian contexts chatbots reproduce the asymmetries between affected people
and humanitarian organisations. The article concludes that ‘AI for good’ is an ‘enchant-
ment of technology’ (Gell, 1992) that reworks the colonial legacies of humanitarianism
whist also occluding the power dynamics at play.
The article develops an interdisciplinary framework that brings together the decolo-
nial critique of humanitarianism and critical algorithm studies. This framework is pre-
sented in the following section before discussing the empirical context and findings.
A decolonial approach to humanitarianism and AI
The challenges for the humanitarian sector and the promise of technology
Humanitarianism is a complex phenomenon: not just the ‘imperative to reduce suffering’
(Calhoun, 2008), but also an industry (Krause, 2014), a discourse (Chouliaraki, 2013) and
a historical phenomenon with roots in nineteenth and twentieth century colonialisms
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(Lester & Dussart, 2014). To understand humanitarianism, one has to understand the
power relations between mostly western ‘saviours’ and the suffering ‘others’who are typi-
cally former colonial subjects in the so-called ‘global South’. This fundamental asymme-
try is at the heart of every humanitarian intervention including those involving ‘AI for
good’. Decolonial theory can help explain how humanitarianism reproduces Eurocentric
systems of knowledge and social and racial hierarchies which sustain the ‘coloniality of
power’, a notion developed by Quijano (2000) to explain ‘western’ dominance globally
after the end of colonial rule.
With over 206.4 million people needing humanitarian assistance in 2018, and over
79.5 million forcibly displaced people by the end of 2019, the humanitarian sector
faces significant challenges.5 The scale and scope of humanitarian operations have
grown significantly over the past couple of decades while the sector is marked by an
increasing marketisation with intense competition for funding (Krause, 2014). Donors
demand efficiencies and evidence of impact, which often explain the push for digital tech-
nologies which are celebrated for their cost-cutting potential and for providing metrics
for audit (Madianou et al., 2016). The private sector has a very active presence in the
humanitarian field, mainly in the form of private-public partnerships, or through private
foundations, or corporate social responsibility policies (McDonald, 2019). One such
example is the Karim chatbot which was developed by the X2AI Foundation – the
non-profit arm of X2AI. Private companies are driven by a wider capitalist logic that
reframes political problems as problems with business solutions (Madianou, 2019a).
Digital innovation is proposed as a solution to several of the sector challenges. This
includes the pressures to democratise humanitarianism: to increase the participation
of, and accountability to affected communities through initiatives such as ‘Communicat-
ing with Communities’ (CwC) or ‘Accountability with Affected People’ (AAP) (Madia-
nou et al., 2016). The interactive nature of digital technologies is rendered as an
opportunity to facilitate the participation of affected communities in their own recovery
and correct the asymmetries on which humanitarianism is based.
Chatbots are the latest iteration in a long lineage of technologies developed to improve
information dissemination among and feedback by affected people. Yet, the data trails of
some of those earlier applications reveal that the main purpose of feedback channels is to
produce audit trails which are in turn used to justify the funding of humanitarian pro-
jects. An earlier ethnography of the recovery from Typhoon Haiyan found that the
SMS hotlines which were meant to improve feedback, and therefore accountability to
affected people, were actually primarily used for audit reporting. The capacity of digital
platforms to aggregate data and forward them as evidence of impact played a vital role in
this process (Madianou et al., 2016). Apart from the extraction of data, innovation prac-
tices also allow the extraction of value from experimentation with untested technologies
(Madianou, 2019a). The hype generated by innovation in humanitarian settings trans-
lates into heightened visibility and interest in new products and services which is particu-
larly attractive for companies seeking branding opportunities.
AI and ‘AI for good’: mythology and colonial legacies
AI refers to several phenomena including computational approaches (for example,
machine learning, which in turn can include advanced neural networks, or natural
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language processing); and practices, such as design or coding. AI is also a ‘planetary
infrastructure’ (Crawford & Joler, 2018). Crucially, AI is also a set of discourses around
technology. Narratives about AI influence the design of new applications (Natale, 2019),
as well as their public perception and regulation. Given the opacity around the workings
of algorithms and automation (Pasquale, 2015) the public’s understanding of AI is inevi-
tably shaped by popular culture narratives (Craig et al., 2018). The term ‘artificial intelli-
gence’ is loaded with meaning, implying a ‘thinking’ machine, even in cases where there
is little evidence of autonomous thinking. Anthropomorphism, the attributing of human
characteristics such as intelligence to software programmes (for example, when asserting
that ‘the machine learns’) carries powerful connotations of agency. At the same time, the
use of the term ‘nonhuman’ to refer to automation and AI, also performs important dis-
cursive work. ‘Nonhuman’ implies a distancing, if not a complete removal of human sub-
jectivity from processes of computation concealing the fact that AI is the result of human
labour often in exploitative conditions (Anwar & Graham, 2020).
The above discourses are exemplified in the case of chatbots which are software pro-
grammes that can recognise text, or voice-based inputs and interact with humans online
(Gehl & Bakadjieva, 2017). Chatbots have a long history going back to ELIZA, the first chat-
bot created by Weizenbaum (1966) at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in the
1960s. The idea of the ‘thinking machine’ can be traced back to Alan Turing, who in 1950
argued that computers were capable ‘intelligent behaviour’. The ‘Turing test’, originally
known as the ‘Imitation Game’, aims to prove whether ‘machines can think’ in the context
of conversations (Turing, 1950). To pass the test, a machine has to produce humanlike
responses so that an independent evaluator cannot tell the machine and the human apart.
Not all chatbots would pass the Turing test. The degree of intelligence in AI operations
varies dramatically (Broussard, 2018). Low-level chatbots, probably the majority of chat-
bots, provide answers from a list of predetermined questions. Such chatbots can be useful
in handling ‘frequently asked questions’ where questions and answers are pre-scripted,
but they can’t respond to more complex questions nor hold a conversation (Bakardjieva,
2015). Advanced chatbots on the other hand, run on natural language processing and
machine learning algorithms which aim to imitate human language. Most chatbots are
somewhere in the middle: for example, they can respond to keywords or simple phrases,
but they are not able to reproduce ‘natural language’.
Just as big data are surrounded by ‘the aura of truth, objectivity, and accuracy’ (boyd &
Crawford, 2012), AI is underpinned by a similar ‘mythology’: a set of beliefs that its ‘intel-
ligence’ is scientifically proven and therefore more advanced than previous forms of com-
putation or innovation. This is typical of a teleological understanding of technology,
where the latest iteration is claimed to be better and more advanced than the previous
ones (Kember & Zylinska, 2012). Nowhere is the mythology of ‘artificial intelligence’
stronger than in the AI4SG phenomenon. The ‘for-good’ element of the phrase, makes
a moral claim about the purpose of technology whilst occluding the underlying power
relations. By foregrounding technology as ‘good’, AI4SG forecloses critical questions
regarding the aforementioned asymmetries of humanitarianism and the way they
shape humanitarian innovation. Likewise, the emphasis on ‘good’ obscures the way tech-
nology companies often use AI4SG projects to entrench their position in public life. Cru-
cially, the term AI4SG assumes consensus on what ‘social good’ is, when the term is
fundamentally contested. What is good for one group, may not be good for others.
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Surveys of AI4SG projects confirm that there is no agreement about what good means
(Floridi et al., 2020; Shi et al., 2020). If some consensus exists, it revolves around the
orientation towards the UN’s sustainable development goals (SDGs) which are the
focus of the annual ‘AI for Good’ Summit.6 By closely aligning to the framework of inter-
national development, AI4SG inherits some the criticisms regarding development and
humanitarianism discussed earlier, namely the reproduction of asymmetrical relation-
ships between the so-called Global North and South. AI4SG projects which take a top-
down approach that presupposes what good is, revive some of the long-standing criti-
cisms about development and humanitarianism as preserving Eurocentric systems of
knowledge and, ultimately, the coloniality of power.
These observations are accentuated by the geographic imbalance of AI4SG projects. A
comprehensive survey of over 1000 AI4SG applications between 2008 and 2020 found
that the overwhelming majority of projects were US-based, while the few projects that
focused on Africa were run by US researchers (Shi et al., 2020, p. 45). While there are
AI4SG projects, including chatbots, which are designed to engage community members
(Luria et al., 2020), the majority of Global South projects appear to be top-down (Shi
et al., 2020). Computation, and the classifications on which it is based, mirror the values
of its coders (Gebru, 2020) which is one of the reasons why processes of automation
reproduce and heighten inequality (Eubanks, 2017) and racial and gendered discrimi-
nation (Benjamin, 2019; Noble, 2018).
A decolonial approach to AI for social good, doesn’t just reveal the power asymmetries
underpinning development and humanitarian projects. It also highlights the fact that AI
is part of larger genealogies of enumeration, measurement and classification that were
originally developed by imperial powers to control colonial subjects (Appadurai,
1993). Biometrics, which in its contemporary iteration is based on AI, was first developed
in India as part of the British Empire’s efforts to control colonial subjects (Sengoopta,
2003). The colonial genealogies of science are also evident in the way former colonies
are used as laboratories for experimentation (Petryna, 2009), a legacy echoed in some
AI4SG pilots. Cloaking such practices in the moral discourse of the ‘social good’ echoes
Mbembe’s observation that morality was historically used to rationalise colonial practices
(2017, p. 11).
A decolonial approach to ‘AI for good’ shifts the emphasis from questions of ethics to
questions of power. The overarching question this article asks is whether humanitarian
chatbots, as exemplars of AI4SG, can contribute to challenging inequalities in the global
context. This divides into further sub-questions. Do chatbots in humanitarian settings
fulfil the promise of intelligence in their ability to hold a conversation? Do chatbots con-
tribute to improved accountability and communication with affected communities? Are
there any harms relating to chatbot communication in humanitarian settings? Who
benefits from such initiatives and do chatbots revive the colonial legacies on which
both humanitarianism and technology are based?
Studying chatbots as part of humanitarian innovation
The article is part of a larger study on digital innovation, data and automation in the
humanitarian sector. This is an ethnographic, mixed methods study including interviews,
participant observation in spaces of innovation and digital ethnography. In total, I
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conducted 45 interviews with seven groups of stakeholders (including humanitarian
officers, donors, entrepreneurs and business representatives, digital developers, govern-
ment representatives, consultants, volunteers).7 This was a purposive sample: intervie-
wees were selected in terms of their expertise and its relevance to the research
questions. Effort was made to speak to people at different levels within the various organ-
isational hierarchies. Although not all 45 interviews addressed chatbots directly, the pre-
sent article incorporates insights from the analysis of all interviews regarding digital
innovation in humanitarian operations. The research was informed by the ESRC’s Fra-
mework for Research Ethics.8 Interviews were conducted between July 2016 and June
2020 and took place online (via video platforms), or in person (in London, Cambridge,
UK; Athens, New York and Washington, DC). Interviews lasted 60–90 min on average
and were recorded, transcribed, coded and analysed thematically. All interviews were
anonymised and are presented here in an aggregate form in order to protect the anon-
ymity of expert interviewees. For example, when I refer to aid sector participants this
may include humanitarian workers or consultants. The article also draws on fieldnotes
I took during participant observation at 12 industry events and hackathons.
The article also draws on digital ethnography (Pink et al., 2016): I have consulted
blogs, websites, podcasts, videos of talks and relevant events, policy documents, social
media content as well as a close reading of documentation regarding the development
of chatbots.9 Finally, I draw on my own interactions with open access humanitarian chat-
bots. This autoethnographic exploration, common in digital ethnographies (Barassi,
2020) allowed me to experience first-hand the platform interface.
Humanitarian chatbots: an overview
Chatbots have been developed by humanitarian organisations such as UNHCR and the
WFP as well as by private companies such as X2AI, which launched the psychotherapy
chatbot ‘Karim’, or ‘Refugee Text’, which launched an eponymous chatbot in 2016 to
respond to the informational needs of refugees arriving into Europe.10 Although private
initiatives such as ‘Refugee Text’ received considerable media attention and recognition
after being included in a 2017 exhibition at the Design Museum in London, the take up
appears to be very minimal.11 Humanitarian agencies have explored the potential of chat-
bots for information dissemination, communication with communities and accountabil-
ity to affected people. Another important motivation for humanitarian agencies is cost
cutting and efficiencies. For example, the UNHCR Innovation Service, in collaboration
with Facebook, developed a chatbot for the UNHCR office in Jordan in order to help
with the high volume of calls and the associated costs. The initial pilot (2017–2018)
uncovered many issues, including a number of legal and data protection issues, which
led UNHCR to decide to withdraw the bot.12
The World Food Programme (WFP), through its Mobile Vulnerability and Analysis
Unit (mVAM), has been at the frontline of chatbot development in the humanitarian sec-
tor since at least 2016. The first chatbot pilot aimed to reach displaced communities and
conduct a mobile food security survey. That chatbot ran on the messaging platform Tele-
gram, but subsequent versions used Facebook because it was an already popular platform
among the target communities.13 These earlier chatbots were developed with the Artifi-
cial Intelligence Development Assistance (AIDA) builder which allows the uploading of
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questionnaires and spreadsheets and streamlines the collection of structured data. The
WFP mVAM unit states that the benefit of disseminating a survey via a chatbot isn’t
only the ‘low cost’, but that the method can ‘provide a great incentive for people to com-
plete [the] surveys and [provide] feedback on the services we provide’.14 The mVAM unit
identified three core uses for chatbots: information dissemination, simple data collection,
and feedback and complaints systems.15
Later versions of the WFP chatbot were developed using CHITCHAT which uses
Natural Language Processing capabilities (NLP) to produce more ‘natural’ conversations.
The CHITCHAT chatbot was deployed through lightweight websites as opposed to Face-
book and was tested in the Kakuma and Kalobeyei refugee camps in Western Kenya.16
According to a review case study, the pilot was hampered by serious access issues in
the two camps, which are indicative of digital inequality patterns among displaced
people.17 In Kakuma 90% of households had access to either a basic mobile phone or
smartphone and internet was available in some locations. By contrast, in Kalobeyei
fewer than 20% of households had a phone while charging was difficult and expensive.
While many young people claimed to have Facebook accounts, few could access them
as they had not yet obtained a Kenyan SIM card and struggled to do so without the
proper identification (DIAL, 2018, p. 12). In both camps, mobile internet data were
often unaffordable with refugees struggling to pay expensive rates without any sources
of income. In other pilots, the WFP relied on the Facebook programme ‘Free Basics’
in order to navigate access issues.18 The latest iteration of the WFP chatbot is ‘Agrocha-
tea’, an automated chatbot that provides wholesale market prices for agricultural produce
using Natural Language Processing capabilities. Agrochatea was developed by the WFP,
the Peruvian government and the Centre for Innovation at Leiden University and is also
accessible through a dedicated lightweight website that can run on both smartphones and
basic internet-enabled phones.19
The analysis that follows refers to the above examples which are representative of simi-
lar developments in the humanitarian sector.
Artificial conversations, unintelligent bots
On close inspection, several humanitarian chatbots confirm the conclusion of a recent
report that they are ‘simple functional bots that stick reliably to a predefined script’
(ICRC et al., 2017). Even CHITCHAT which uses Natural Language Processing offers
answers from a range of pre-defined options. According to the WFP website, the CHIT-
CHAT bot allows for ‘more natural conversations’ … ‘as users chat with the bot using
their own questions rather than keywords and the bot answers with information relating
to their query’.20 My interaction with the bot,21 on 10 separate occasions between Feb-
ruary and December 2020 exposed several limitations. Every time I asked a complex
question such as ‘why do people in Kakuma and Kalobeyei receive different cash assist-
ance’ the chatbot responded ‘Sorry I don’t understand that’ and took me back to the first
step. Below is a transcript of my longest conversation with the chatbot recorded on 2
December 2020. Bamba Chakula means ‘get your food’ in Kiswahili and in this context
refers to the WFP’s cash distribution programme in the refugee camps in Kenya.
Chatbot: Hi There!
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This is an automated chatbot from the World Food Programme. I can help you with ques-
tions about WFP programmes, this chatbot project, Bamba Chakula and General Food
Distributions.
You can ask a question or choose from the topics below. How can I help?





Chatbot: The Next Bamba Chakula will arrive on 27 May [emphasis added].
Is there anything in particular that you would like to know?
You can ask a question or choose from the topics below.
• Info about Bamba
• Get Balance
• Amount
Researcher: how much will I receive?
Chatbot: First are you in Kalobeyei or Kakuma?
Researcher: Kakuma
Chatbot: It also depends on the size of your family.
How MANY PERSONS are there in your household?
Researcher: 1
Chatbot: In Kakuma, Bamba Chakula is 400 KES per person.
Researcher: Why do people in Kakuma and Kalobeyei receive different amounts?
Chatbot: Sorry, I don’t understand that.
This is chatbot that can help you with questions about Bamba Chakula, General Food Dis-
tributions (GFD), and information about WFP programmes in Kakuma and Kalobeyei.




While in this example CHITCHAT was able to recognise phrases and provide useful
answers, it wasn’t able to decode my more complex question. Recall that this is the long-
est conversation I held with the chatbot – most interactions ended after my first or
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second question. On this occasion, the chatbot also provided me with wrong information
regarding the date. Given Bamba Chakula is a monthly distribution, the earliest date after
December cannot be May.22 According to one of the aid sector interviewees: ‘these chat-
bots aren’t very different from the surveys that already go out’ via traditional means […]
what’s different is speed, efficiency’. Given that humanitarian contexts give rise to com-
plex problems that do not fit predetermined categories, the limited degree to which a
chatbot can respond is a problem.
This finding shouldn’t be surprising. Humanitarian chatbots follow the established
tradition of humanitarian feedback policies. By feedback most humanitarian organis-
ations refer to comments about specific interventions that they have initiated. This
narrow definition of feedback became apparent in an earlier ethnography which exam-
ined the humanitarian response to Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines.23 In that context,
aid agencies solicited feedback in relation to the delivery of particular services. For
example, an agency which had rolled out a sanitation initiative, would only collect feed-
back on that particular project – not on other issues which may have been more pressing
among affected people. As a result, more global comments regarding people’s experiences
were not systematically recorded (Madianou et al., 2016). In the rare occasions when
more general issues were recorded, they were not responded to as they didn’t fit into
the remit of each particular agency or cluster which created a disconnect between affected
people and humanitarian organisations (Madianou et al., 2016). An aid worker intervie-
wee described this problem:
Humanitarian organisations are constantly sent information that doesn’t fit neatly into
buckets. So people will say, I got information about political violence, but we’re supposed
to be a neutral humanitarian project, what do you do with that? So there’s all these kinds
of situations where it’s not going to fit neatly.
Chatbots represent the logical step in the tradition of digitised feedback in the humani-
tarian sector. Rather than facilitating a meaningful engagement with communities, feed-
back is instrumentalised and reduced to formulaic interactions and templates. Chatbots
also prioritise information dissemination, a process which doesn’t require the complex
infrastructure of AI. As an NGO participant remarked:
All chatbots are about pushing information out. Even ‘Refugee Text’ is: ‘tell us your status
and we’ll give you some information on that basis’. Maybe at best it’s tailored information,
but it’s not a conversation. […] Participation is hard to do. It’s easy to push out information.
These observations are compounded by another limitation of the chat format which
privileges short text rather than longer questions or explanations. In my earlier
research with communities affected by Typhoon Haiyan, where feedback was collected
through SMS texting, the character limit of that particular channel prevented partici-
pants from expressing complex concerns for example, regarding their exclusion from
aid distribution lists (Madianou et al., 2016). While the CHITCHAT bot has no char-
acter limits, the genre of Instant Messaging which it emulates favours brief inputs. The
brevity of text interactions is also necessary as the chatbot is more likely to respond to
very short commands rather than complex sentences. According to one of the aid sec-
tor interviewees:
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there’s going to be a lot of messy, complicated situations all where things change very fast
where it’s just not appropriate to give people automated answers and feel it’s accurate. Auto-
mation in this approach has the potential to be very dehumanising.
Automation is a technology of distancing. As the term ‘nonhuman’ implies, automation
streamlines processes at a distance, thus separating a person from the consequences of
their actions. Automation can also be a frustrating experience when a chatbot doesn’t
understand one’s questions and abruptly restarts the conversation. Anyone who has
struggled with automated responses in customer service departments, when no predeter-
mined answer seems to address one’s query, can probably sympathise with these
observations.
Although it’s not the aim of this article to provide a systematic evaluation of specific
apps, their narrow topic remit and their limited capacity to respond to questions that
deviate from the standard script raises concerns about their usefulness. Another issue
is whether the topics covered resonate with the actual needs of communities. The
example of ‘Agrochatea’, the WFP chatbot that provides real time information of market
produce, evokes the study by Burrell and Oreglia (2015) on ‘the myth of market-price
information’. Drawing on two ethnographies in China and Uganda, Burell and Oreglia
contested the oft-repeated notion that farmers use mobile phones to access market
price information. While their ethnographies revealed several creative uses of mobile
phones, there was no evidence that people used their phones to find out about market
prices and therefore increase the efficiency of their transactions. The authors question
the myth of ‘market price information’ which has become a ‘shorthand for the potential
of digital technologies to empower low-income communities in the global south’ (Burrell
& Oreglia, 2015, p. 271). Their study illustrates how predefined notions of ‘social good’ in
development projects do not correspond with the experiences of local communities. One
wonders whether ‘Agrochatea’ is the product of the ‘market information mantra’, or
whether the chatbot’s developers responded to genuine community demand for this
kind of information.
When ‘AI for good’ can be harmful
While there are clear questions regarding the intelligence and usefulness of chatbots, this
doesn’t mean there are no potential harms. The first issue to consider is the question of
data safeguards especially given the heightened vulnerability of humanitarian settings.
The fact that many of the above chatbots use existing platforms such as Facebook Mes-
senger or Whatsapp means that the safeguarding and privacy of the data of humanitarian
subjects is outsourced to Silicon Valley companies. By outsourcing services to Facebook,
humanitarian agencies inherit the concerns surrounding the business model of social
media companies whereby users’ data are extracted for profit (Zuboff, 2019). By relying
on Facebook or other messaging apps for essential services, humanitarian agencies
extend their remit (‘the imperative to do good’ and ‘do no harm’) to private technology
companies (McDonald, 2019). In the case of the AIDA chatbot, the use of Facebook Mes-
senger wasn’t the result of a formal partnership which meant that the WFP had no con-
trol over the safeguarding of the data and metadata, which are equally sensitive when
dealing with persons of concern (ICRC and Privacy International, 2018). The same
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applies to the case of the psychotherapy chatbot, Karim. Even in cases when humanitar-
ian organisations sign formal partnerships with big technology companies it is not clear
‘what leverage they have to ensure the enforcement of that control’ (McDonald, 2019,
p. 4). This asymmetry is even more pronounced in the aforementioned chatbot cases
where no contract with Facebook has been signed.
Although not explicitly stated, such privacy and data safeguarding concerns may have
contributed to the shifting of the WFP chatbots to a dedicated lightweight website. Issues
of safeguarding, of course, remain relevant even with the bespoke light website. Huma-
nitarian organisations are often the target of cyber-attacks.24 The vulnerability from
potential data breaches is amplified by the aid agencies’ ‘tendency to maximize data col-
lection just in case it’s needed in the future’ a point that came up in several interviews.
Ironically, if the lightweight website evades the questionable data extraction practices
of social media platforms, it may be less accessible to local communities. The reason,
after all, for using Facebook Messenger for the original WFP chatbot, was because it
was already part of people’s communication environments. An aid sector interviewee
expressed their reservation about the success of bespoke apps or websites as ‘they are
not part of [the refugees’] communication ecologies’. Facebook is also implicated in
access issues as the WFP encourages access to its lightweight websites through Free
Basics, a programme criticised for its extractive logics (Nothias, 2020).
Of greater concern is the potential risk of misinformation if, for example, an app is out
of date and offers mistaken information as evidenced in my interaction with the CHIT-
CHAT bot discussed above. If a refugee is given wrong dates or other out-of-date infor-
mation the consequences can be severe. As one of the NGO interviewees put it, ‘if a
chatbot directs refugees to the wrong meeting point, and it has taken them hours and
money to get there this can be very problematic’. Misinformation, however uninten-
tional, can be at odds with the humanitarian imperative of ‘do no harm’. This raises
the issue of responsibility in ‘human-machine communication’ (Gunkel, 2018). Who is
responsible if a chatbot disseminates out-of-date information? Who can be held accoun-
table? This is why the same interviewee remarked: ‘You’ve got to have a human there,
who can step in. But given these apps are driven by efficiency concerns, I’m not sure
they will be prepared to resource it’.
The lack of meaningful communication reveals that, just like with several other huma-
nitarian innovations, the purpose of chatbots is to maximise efficiencies and savings
which is openly acknowledged in the blogs and websites which accompany the
UNHCR and WFP chatbots.25 Aiming for efficiency isn’t necessarily harmful, unless
the logic of efficiency and cost-cutting reduces interactions to their barest instrumental
forms. This can be problematic if affected people are promised ‘participation’ and
‘accountability’ as part of AAP initiatives, but are ultimately only offered a box-ticking
exercise. In the Typhoon Haiyan research discussed earlier, the formulaic nature of feed-
back mechanisms was felt deeply among affected people, many of whom felt discon-
nected from the aid agencies especially when their messages were not responded to
(Madianou et al., 2016). If chatbots represent a similarly monological proposition,
they will only provide an illusion of accountability.
Such concerns are likely to be exacerbated if the logic of efficiency is accompanied by
the extraction of data for audit purposes. As discussed above, the marketisation of the
humanitarian field has created pressures for constant reporting in order to satisfy the
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donors’ demand for evidence of impact and audit trails which are then used to justify the
renewal of funding. One of my aid sector interviewees described chatbots and feedback
apps as ‘sucking apps… because they suck from communities’. This illustrates that
humanitarian subjects pay for aid with their own data which are extracted to legitimate
humanitarian projects. Extraction also occurs through the value accrued by the exper-
imentation with untested technologies in humanitarian settings – something I shall
explore in the following section.
Reproducing coloniality
Chatbots, like all forms of algorithmic culture, contribute to defining the parameters of
humanitarian aid. The algorithms of natural language processing ‘condense plural poss-
ible pathways to a single output’ (Amoore, 2020, p. 17) thus foreclosing other possibili-
ties. When considering what kind of knowledge, the chatbots produce, it is important to
remember what an aid sector interviewee noted: chatbots – just like most innovations –
‘have western bias in their design. [They] are tested on people in their vicinity’. Even
though the WFP foodbot was piloted in Kenya, it was conceived of, and designed in,
hackathons and labs far removed from the reality of the refugee camps. For example,
the AIDA foodbot was developed in a hackathon organised by the global marketing
and data analytics company Neilsen on behalf of mVAM in New York City in January
2017. The hackathon was attended by ‘developers, students, volunteer hackers and Neil-
sen staff’ (DIAL, 2018, p. 9) – presumably all residents of New York or other global cities.
This reflects a point that many of my interviewees agreed on: hackathons are mostly
white and male with no refugee participation. This observation confirms my own experi-
ence of several hackathons where no refugees or members of affected communities took
part. A survey of 49 AI applications in the humanitarian sector confirms that all are led by
organisations in the Global North (predominantly North America and Europe).26
Given the design and management of AI4SG projects is located in the Global North it
is not surprising that the values which inform some of these platforms are western-cen-
tric. For example, the notion of accountability that informs policies of ‘Accountability to
Affected People’ is a Eurocentric notion that often has little purchase in local contexts.
Earlier research in the Philippines, reported that humanitarian aid was filtered through
local norms of debt of gratitude, which itself was grounded in colonial legacies and local
patronage politics (Madianou et al., 2016). The local idioms around humanitarian aid as
gratitude were at odds with the assumptions of humanitarian accountability policies
which usually translate narrowly into feedback collection. In the Philippine study,
local norms prevented members of affected communities from any public expressions
of criticism even when their private accounts were highly critical of aid operations.
The language in which chatbots operate is vital here. While some of the WFP chatbots
(e.g., Agrochatea) are translated into local languages, others are not (e.g., CHITCHAT
bot in Kakuma pilot). Defending that decision, the mVAM team argued that most of
their target users already spoke English.27 However, communication in English excludes
older users who were also experiencing additional access issues. Translating the bot into
the languages (Dinka, Kiswahili or Somali) spoken in the Western Kenya refugee camps
is a vital step towards inclusivity. Decolonial writers like Wa Thiong’o have stressed how
‘language carries culture and culture carries […] the entire body of values through which
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we perceive ourselves and our place in the world’ (2004, p. 16). Language serves as tool
that sustains global hierarchies.
The importance of cultural sensitivity is even more vital for chatbots like the psy-
chotherapy one (‘Karim’) which opened the article. Awareness of cultural norms and
idioms is crucial in psychotherapy especially as sociocultural factors contribute to mental
health and illness. Given the cultural specificity of emotions, a deep understanding of cul-
tural codes and norms is necessary for psychotherapy to be successful. The same applies
to gender, sexuality and social class which, too, are culturally specific. Cultural sensitivity
is not just achieved by translating script into different languages. What matters is under-
standing how emotions like shame manifest differently depending on the cultural context
which requires a deep immersion in a local culture. Cultural sensitivity can also be
achieved by the inclusion of local trained psychotherapists who can intervene when
necessary. ‘Karim’ is a pared down version of ‘Tess’, X2AI’s behavioural coaching chatbot
that addresses depression and anxiety through existing instant messaging apps (Stephens
et al., 2019). While ‘Tess’ serves as a therapeutic tool that supplements, rather than
replaces the role of a therapist,28 the roll out of ‘Karim’ was not accompanied by the par-
allel availability of professional psychotherapists.
Such asymmetries in the roll out of similar platforms in the US and Lebanon echo
arguments about scientific experimentation in former colonies (Petryna, 2009), which
I discussed earlier in the article as part of colonial genealogies. Why are trained psy-
chotherapists necessary to support US users of chatbots, but not refugees in Lebanon?
Why are refugees in Lebanon receiving a ‘pared down’ version of the chatbot, when
the mental health issues they face can be more acute due to the trauma of war? Private
companies involved in AI4SG projects often extract value from experimentation with
untested technologies. By piloting technologies such as chatbots, private companies
extract value to improve the design of their products and crucially, to generate hype
around their innovations, which translates into attention and ultimately profit. As one
aid sector participant put it:
We have this interesting situation that we’re in […] when companies invest a lot of time and
effort for products that they haven’t yet found a market for. […] And there’s a lot of effort
trying to create hype. The humanitarian sector is one of the ways of creating headlines. This
is essentially advertising for companies.
The psychotherapy chatbot aimed at Syrian refugees in Lebanon is a good example of
how a particular pilot can generate interest in a company. X2AI received significant pub-
licity for its non-profit work with feature articles in publications such as the New Yorker
and The Guardian among others29, which it might not have received for its other pro-
ducts. Experimentation in vulnerable settings can translate into publicity and ultimately,
profit. The hype around chatbots, just like the hype around other innovations such as
blockchain (Madianou, 2021) is one of the driving forces in the development and roll
out of humanitarian innovations especially those involving the private sector. This is a
point where the logics of technological solutionism and capitalism meet the logic of
humanitarian marketisation creating a dynamic described as technocolonialism (Madia-
nou, 2019a). The desire for efficiencies and audit trails, often demanded by donors, finds
the perfect match in the logic of solutionism which is often pushed by large technology
companies that seek branding opportunities and visibility for their products.
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The fact that chatbots are designed in the Global North and implemented in the Glo-
bal South, as is typical for AI4SG humanitarian projects; the fact that projects do not
always have the linguistic, or cultural sensitivity required; and finally, the extraction of
value from experimentation with untested technologies all contribute to the reworking
of the colonial legacies of humanitarianism and AI4SG.
The following section puts forward an additional way in which humanitarian AI4SG
projects reproduce power asymmetries.
A technology of enchantment?
The power of ‘AI for good’ is most evident in the ways in which it produces a sense of
enchantment. I here draw on Gell’s seminal work on ‘The Technology of Enchantment
and the Enchantment of Technology’ (1992). Gell was interested in how artifacts ‘cast a
spell’ over people by ‘functioning as weapons in psychological warfare’ (1992, p. 44). The
example he uses is the intricate and imposing canoe prow board from the Trobriand
islands which is exquisitely crafted to dazzle the Trobrianders’ overseas partners so
that they will ‘take leave of their senses and offer more valuable shells or necklaces to
the members of the expedition than they would otherwise be inclined to do’ (Gell,
1992, p. 44). The prow board, with its intricate engraving and adornments, enchants
and helps the Trobrianders achieve their goal to maximise the value of their trade.
The canoe-board ultimately confers magical prowess on the owners of the canoe
whose power and status are, in turn, heightened.
The magical efficacy of technology is achieved by hiding the work through which it
was produced (Gell, 1992). In other words, ‘the enchantment of technology’ (the hold
technologies have on us) depends on ‘the technology of enchantment’ – the actual mak-
ing of artifacts (Gell, 1992). This crafting typically includes erasure, or in the case of com-
munication technologies, ‘immediacy’ (Bolter & Grusin, 2000). Immediacy refers to the
capacity of mediation to erase its own work, to appear natural, or unmediated. The opa-
city of algorithms and systems of automation is a perfect example of ‘immediacy’, which
is one of the reasons why Chun (2011, p. 87) describes software as ‘magic’. If chatbots,
however limited in their capabilities, are examples of the ‘enchantment of technology’
(Gell, 1992) then that makes them potentially more powerful. Their power relates to
the way they are fetishised as powerful, or enchanted; not necessarily in their efficacious-
ness. Ultimately, the enchanted object, in this case the chatbot, confers power to its
owner: the humanitarian organisations or the private companies and their philanthropic
departments. When the ‘Refugee Text’ chatbot was selected for inclusion in the 2018
Beazley Designs of the Year exhibition at the Design Museum in London, it represented
a clear case of the ‘enchantment of technology’. Through its selection and display in a
high-profile exhibition, the chatbot acquired enchanted status as an item of cultural
and social significance. Similarly, the extensive publicity that the psychotherapy chatbot
received, conferred visibility to its company. The ‘enchantment of technology’ also
explains why ‘AI for good’ is increasingly appropriated as a marketing and branding
strategy.
Placing an ‘enchanted technology’ in a very asymmetrical context can potentially
amplify existing power imbalances. By conferring authority to humanitarian organis-
ations and for-profit companies, chatbots rework and revitalise the existing asymmetries
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of humanitarianism and reproduce the coloniality of power. Humanitarian AI may not
be an example of ‘psychological warfare’ (Gell, 1992), but it certainly has the potential to
create hierarchies and boundaries between the owners and recipients of technology. In
the case of the Design Museum exhibition, the clear winners are the chatbot developers
who gained visibility and distinction through their inclusion in a high-profile exhibition.
This contrasts with the invisibility of refugees, who remain stuck in camps in Greece and
Italy and whose plight provided the raw material for the elevation of the chatbot
designers.
Conclusion
The article analysed chatbots as emblematic of ‘AI for social good’ initiatives in the
humanitarian field. The article develops an interdisciplinary framework that brings
together the decolonial critique of humanitarianism and critical algorithm studies and
draws upon a qualitative study of humanitarian innovation in order to unravel some
of the assumptions behind the ‘AI for social good’ phenomenon. This approach shifts
the emphasis from questions of ethics to questions of power. Recognising that humani-
tarianism, as well as AI, are steeped in unequal relations of power, the analysis focused on
the extent to which chatbots reproduce inequalities and colonial legacies.
The article observed that humanitarian chatbots remain limited in terms of being able
to ‘hold a conversation’ which is how chatbot ‘intelligence’ is often defined. Even if they
are not as powerful as is often suggested in popular discourses, chatbots still have power-
ful consequences. The article identified significant risks regarding data safeguards and
misinformation which can have deleterious implications for refugees and other vulner-
able people. Chatbots reduce participation and feedback to its barest instrumental
forms which creates disconnects between affected communities and aid agencies. This
disconnect is compounded by the extraction of value from data for the purposes of
audit and humanitarian metrics. The distancing of automation, which is often referred
to as ‘nonhuman computation’, has the potential to dehumanise interactions in the
humanitarian context whilst claiming to be objective and scientific.
Because humanitarian chatbots are designed in the Global North and implemented in
the South, and because of the concerns regarding linguistic or cultural sensitivity, I have
argued that such innovations rework the colonial legacies of humanitarianism and
AI4SG. The extraction of value from the experimentation with untested technologies
further reflects colonial genealogies. The reworking of the power relations of coloniality
and humanitarianism is most evident in the ‘enchantment of technology’ (Gell, 1992). By
‘casting a spell’, technologies amplify social hierarchies and confer status on the technol-
ogy designers. In the case of AI, the enchantment of technology is achieved through the
occlusion of the work of algorithms and the parallel obscuring of the underlying relations
of inequality. The notion of the ‘enchantment of technology’ (Gell, 1992) suggests that
AI4SG, together with other sociotechnical assemblages, may play a constitutive role in
the reworking of colonial legacies.
Not all chatbots are the same. For example, there are differences between public and
private innovations. Yet on the whole, the structural issues regarding power asymmetries,
knowledge production and enchantment apply to all the examples discussed here. The
distinction between good or bad forms of AI misses the point. All forms of AI contribute
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to knowledge production and, ultimately, the way the world is perceived. As Amoore
(2020) argues, there are no good, or bad algorithms; all algorithms define the parameters
of social life. Similarly, it is not meaningful to define AI as good or bad. But because all
forms of AI perform a worldmaking role, all forms of AI can potentially be harmful.
Notes
1. ‘The chatbot will see you now’: https://www.newyorker.com/tech/annals-of-technology/the-
chatbot-will-see-you-now
2. For a list of all UN sustainable development goals see: https://www.un.org/
sustainabledevelopment/sustainable-development-goals/
3. Biometric technologies depend on artificial intelligence in the capturing, segmenting and
indexing of biometric data, as well as in the matching of biometric records against large
databases. Because of the way they involve states and policies of securitisation, biometrics




6. see notes 2 and 4 for the UN SDGs and AI for Good Summit.
7. These distinctions aren’t always clear cut, partly because participants may have, or have had
multiple roles, for example as aid workers and consultants; or entrepreneurs and digital
developers.
8. https://esrc.ukri.org/funding/guidance-for-applicants/research-ethics/
9. Hundreds of sources were collected as part of the wider project which have shaped my
understanding of humanitarian innovation. The article references 28 of those sources,
details of which can be found in the notes.
10. http://www.refugeetext.org/
11. Beazley Designs of the Year, The Design Museum: https://designmuseum.org/exhibitions/
beazley-designs-of-the-year/digital-20x/refugee-text ‘How Chatbots are helping refugees navi-
gate a new life’, The Guardian: https://www.theguardian.com/public-leaders-network/2016/
oct/17/refugee-information-facebook-social-media-tech-help Last accessed 26 November 2020.
12. UNHCR Innovation Service: Chatbots in humanitarian settings: revolutionary, a fad or
something in-between? https://www.unhcr.org/innovation/chatbots-in-humanitarian-
settings-revolutionary-a-fad-or-something-inbetween/ Last accessed 26 November 2020.
13. WFP, mVAM: Introducing our chatbot: http://mvam.org/2016/07/21/introducing-our-
chatbot/
14. WFP, mVAM: Introducing our chatbot: http://mvam.org/2016/07/21/introducing-our-
chatbot/
15. http://mvam.org/2019/05/29/hi-chatbot-what-have-you-been-up-to-lately/
16. The Kakuma Refugee Camp (established in 1992) in the Turkana district of Western Kenya
is one of the world’s largest refugee camps. Refugees are mostly from South Sudan and
Somalia. The neighbouring settlement of Kalobeiyei was established in 2015 for more recent




19. WFP, mVAM: ¡Hola Agrochatea! http://mvam.org/2019/08/27/hola-agrochatea/
20. Hi Chatbot! Where have you been to lately? http://mvam.org/2019/05/29/hi-chatbot-what-
have-you-been-up-to-lately/ Last accessed 16 December 2020.
21. The chatbot can accessed here: https://speakto.ita.wfp.org/
22. Bamba Chakula: a saviour in times of reduced rations in Kenya. https://medium.com/world-
food-programme-insight/bamba-chakula-a-saviour-in-times-of-reduced-rations-
fd6604b4df44 Last accessed 16 December 2020.
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23. Typhoon Haiyan made landfall on 8 November 2013.
24. Among the several reports of data breaches and cyberattacks involving humanitarian organ-
isations, the most significant occurred in August 2019 involving multiple UN agencies.
https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/investigation/2020/01/29/united-nations-cyber-
attack Last accessed 26 November 2020.
25. UNHCR Innovation Service: Chatbots in humanitarian settings: revolutionary, a fad or
something in-between? https://www.unhcr.org/innovation/chatbots-in-humanitarian-




29. Articles in the Guardian https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/mar/22/karim-
the-ai-delivers-psychological-support-to-syrian-refugees, The New Yorker https://www.
newyorker.com/tech/annals-of-technology/the-chatbot-will-see-you-now, Reuters https://
www.reuters.com/video/watch/id117741381, Business Insider https://www.businessinsider.
com/psychotherapy-bot-in-middle-east-2016-3?r=US&IR=T among others.
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